I.

I. INTRODUCTION

Intellectual one's own has become one of the greatest in quantity valuable assets of a large and growing number of domestic and international corporations. Intellectual possessions rights, whether the intellectual ownership is used by the proprietor or licensed to others, are the central means from which companies can internalize for a period of time, and thereby justify, their oftentimes substantial investment in research and growth of complex products and services. In the absence of well-defined intellectual quality rights, free-riding will reduce the value of investment and consequence in slower rates of economic progres and reduc consumer welfare. However, if competition laws overly restrict intellectual possessions rights, the restrictions create brawny incentives for companies to limit the diffusion of as well-as; not only-but also; not only-but; not alone-but intellectual property and the productions and services reliant on that intellectual goods thus limiting international trade. Consequently the international antitrust treatment of intellectual exclusive right assets bears heavily on the expansion of the development of international trade and, ultimately, the rate of progres toward creation of a single global economy.

Several challenges face the international competition law treatment of intellectual exclusive right rights. First, defining the liberty of intellectual property rights can be compages second, careful analysis is required to differentiate restrictions and limitations onward the use and licensing of intellectual estate that affect competition inside the extent of intellectual property rights from restrictions and limitations that affect competition outside the view of intellectual property rights. Third, there is a short post temptation to treat intellectual ownership not as part of an ongoing innovation proces moreover rather, solely as the eventuate of a past innovation proces Thus, for intellectual ownership already in existence, competition authorities mistakenly may diocese no harm in seeking "more procornpetitive outcomes" by way of promoting the free diffusion and exploitation on non-owners of existing intellectual peculiarity The result, however, of regulating intellectual wealth rights substantially reduces the incentive to create modern intellectual property.

This Article will briefly address one of the obstacles at the intersection of trade and competition in the multinational arena that have stimulated discussion, the programs and scenes for creating better global understanding and tendency to meet and some modest steps toward improved transparency and gradual convergence

II. OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION

Even in the case of mature competition regimes, diversity as to substantive antitrust standards is prevalent.1 Progres has been made in the tendency to meet of standards for the definition of relevant intellectual peculiarity rights,2 but those definitions of rights are of limited importance compared to the standards in subordination to which the rights are enforced and licensed.

Unfortunately, the complexity of the issues sometimes hinders achievement of harmonization. allowing intellectual property/antitrust issues have occupied the attention of courts, enforcers, and scholars for one time in the United States, a number of expand questions remain. For example, the superlative Court has yet to unfold certain potential conflicts between intellectual possessions and antitrust principles suggested in sum of two units important recent cases on the subject3

Nonetheless, in the United States, certain basic principles have emerg that help to define the free play of intellectual property rights, their enforcement, and their licensing. For example, a patent possessor who brings a lawsuit to enforce the statutory right to withhold others from making, using, or selling a patented invention generally is let off from the antitrust laws.4 Similarly, the United States generally does not apply the "essential facilities doctrine" to intellectual property5 Instead, the general behavior is that, with limited exceptions, the proprietor of intellectual property, similar to any other possessions may refuse in the United States to license that property6

It is unclear whether the European Union (EU) may be developing a theory approximating the "essential facilities" doctrine to negate a patentee's exclusive right to an innovation and refusal to deal.7 The United States and EU however, undoubtedly differ forward the antitrust legality of various license restrictions, including licensing resulting from patent puddles mandatory grantbacks, and territorial restrictions.8 The different approaches of the pair jurisdictions have the potential of forcing industry to navigate its way from one side disparate, and possibly conflicting, governments on the permissibility of licensing restrictions. A rationalization and gradual approach of approaches is needed to suppress the cloud of uncertainty that has befallen licensing restrictions, and thereby spare industry the kind of protracted litigation that accompanies uncertainty.9

The disparity between the United States and other jurisdictions, like Taiwan and Japan, is smooth more pronounced. In contrast to the United States and the EU Taiwan has glance ated a particularly restrictive approach to patent pond s as evidenced by the statements of Len-Yu Lin, Commissioner of the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, before the Federal Trade Commission/Department of justice Hearings onward Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (FTC/DOJ hearings).10 Although Japanese policy seemingly has undergone a substantial evolution, from restrictive guidelines in 1968 to guidelines more fielded in rule of reason analysis in 1989 and 199911 transparency has not been satisfactorily achieved, partly as a event of the Japanese administrative guidance system12 making it difficult to assess Japan's legal standards.